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THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY. By Jonas Robitscher. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980. Pp. viii, 557, Price $17.95.
Lois G. FoRtR t
Psychiatry and law are often seen as adversaries. Many psychia-
trists claim that mentally ill patients are denied needed treatment
because of legal obstacles placed by the meddling of lawyers and
courts. Lawyers, for their part, often assert that psychiatrists violate
the constitutional rights of individuals. The hostility between these
two points of view appears irreconcilable.
Dr. Jonas Robitscher, both an attorney and a board certified
psychiatrist,' wrote in 1966 a thoughtful, conciliatory book addressed
to both lawyers and psychiatrists. 2 Now, Dr. Robitscher has given
us a more forceful book, The Powers of Psychiatry, which demands
the attention not only of doctors and lawyers but also of legislators
and the general public. He documents, largely from secondary pub-
lished sources, an alarming litany of pervasive psychiatric abuses in
almost every aspect of modem American life.
The conflict between law and psychiatry erupts into public view
frequently in connection with civil involuntary mental health com-
mitments. A typical example of the vehemence of the opposing
points of view occurred in the spring of 1978, when Dr. Thomas
Szasz, a maverick psychiatrist adamantly opposed to involuntary
mental health commitments, gave a public lecture at Philadelphia's
City Hall, under the auspices of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
The audience responded vociferously. Former mental patients who
had been committed to hospitals against their wills-some for years-
emphatically approved his message. Others, principally friends
and relatives of allegedly mentally ill persons no longer subject un-
f Judge, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. A.B. 1935, J.D. 1938, North-
western University. Member, Pennsylvania Bar. Judge Forer is the author of several
books of general interest to lawyers, including: CnuNA.Ls AND VicTms: A TnRALr
JUDGE EEFIECTS ON ChD& AND PUNISHMNT (1980); THE DEATH OF THE LAW
(1975); and No ONE WILL LESSEN: How OUR LEGAL SYSTErM BruTAirZs mm
TOUI.L POOR (1970).
1 Dr. Robitscher is the Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Behavioral Sci-
ences at Emory University and the 1976 winner of the prestigious Isaac Ray Award
for significant contributions in the area of forensic psychiatry.
2J. RoBrrsc= , PURSUIT OF AGnEEmENT: PSyCHirATY AND THE LAw (1966).
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der Pennsylvania's New Mental Health Law 3 to commitment at
will, passionately opposed his views.
The problems of involuntary mental health commitments, as
well as the insanity defense and psychiatric testimony in general,
have been the subjects of much discussion in legal and psychiatric
literature. The great contribution of The Powers of Psychiatry is
the revelation of the enormous range of activities in which psychia-
trists and psychiatry play a crucial and little understood role. Al-
though Dr. Robitscher repeatedly maintains that psychiatry, when
practiced properly, does benefit some patients, his exploration of
the many uses and abuses of psychiatry is damning evidence of a
profession gone amok.4 Had this book been written by a journalist
or a lawyer, it might be dismissed simply as a parade of horribles.3
But Robitscher is neither an outsider nor a reporter looking for sen-
sational material. He is a highly respected practicing psychiatrist,
a distinguished professor, and a recent winner of the prestigious
Isaac Ray Award for significant contributions in the area of forensic
psychiatry. Clearly, we must accord his observations significant
weight.
Psychiatry's uses and abuses are qualitatively different from the
venality and incompetence that are endemic to all professions. Psy-
chiatry has the potential to warp a human life or psyche in ways
not readily visible and seldom remediable. Mental hospitals, usually
located in the country far from prying eyes, do not reveal their se-
crets to the public. The work of psychiatrists, in opinions given
to courts, employers, the military, and family members, may never
become known to the person who is the unwilling subject of psychi-
atric or psychological study. Dr. Robitscher tellingly points out
that psychiatry deals not only with seriously disordered, deranged,
criminal, or violent people, but with the whole population: the in-
fant whose custody is disputed, the parents whose child may be
taken from them, the school child who is tested, classified, labelled,
and perhaps stigmatized, the job-seeker and job-holder who are also
tested and classified, hired and fired on the basis of psychiatric opin-
3 Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 50 PA. STAT. ANN.
§4101-4704 (Purdon 1969) (amended 1976).
4 The reader should refer to chapter 21 of Robitscher's book, which contains
an eclectic listing of 51 ways in which psychiatrists exercise authority. J. RoBrr-
scuri, THE PowEas OF Psycr ATRY 401-05 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
ROBrrsCHER]. The list, while illustrative of the author's thesis, is by no means
comprehensive.
6 See, e.g., H. J.AEs, Crasis IN Tm CounTs (1968); C. SirRmA, CandrAL.
VIOLENCE, GnMI. JUsTIcE (1978) (collating examples of injustices and incom-
petence, principally from newspaper reports and interviews).
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ions, the poor and the non-poor seeking medicaid and insurance
benefits, those accused of crime, those convicted of crime, the elderly,
and ordinary people who do not consider themselves mentally ill,
as well as the media and the general public, whose perception of
norms of behavior and aspiration are affected by psychiatric theories.
The Powers of Psychiatry is organized by categories of situa-
tions in which psychiatrists intervene in the lives of individuals or
participate in organizational and governmental decisions. Dr.
Robitscher does not give an historical or analytical outline of the
profession and its problems. But his overlapping, and sometimes
repetitive, descriptions of psychiatric involvement in the lives of
Ezra Pound, Virginia Woolf, General Edwin Walker, and countless
less well-known individuals, make apparent psychiatry's erratic
,course of development in both diagnosis and treatment.6 Robitscher
is painfully aware that the identification and treatment of people
assumed to be mentally ill has, throughout the relatively short his-
tory of psychiatry, been inconsistent, dangerous, and often bizarre.
In the nineteenth century, drugs such as laudanum and bar-
bituates were widely used with serious addictive results. Then there
was a switch to verbal treatment. Later, psychosurgery was in vogue.
Various parts of the patient's body were removed, from the colon
to the brain. Significantly, the originator of the lobotomy was
awarded a Nobel prize.7 Today, few reputable psychiatrists would
prescribe psychosurgery. It is widely recognized that these opera-
tions resulted in little, if any, benefit and in fact caused great per-
manent harm.8 At present the pendulum has swung back to drugs
such as thorazine, milltown, lithium, anti-depressants, and other
mood-altering chemicals, many of which are addictive and can cause
brain damage. These drugs are widely prescribed today for all
kinds of patients from the "hyperkinetic child" to the hostile senior
citizen who resents institutionalization. Shock therapy and induced
convulsions were once accepted treatments and then abandoned.
6 Dr. Robitscher does not subscribe to the view, held by a small number of
psychiatrists, that there is no such thing as mental illness. See, e.g., T. SzAsz,
THE MYr or MENTAL ILLrNss (1974). He believes that there are people who
are seriously disturbed, cannot function, and/or are a threat to themselves and
others. See ROBrrSCHE, supra note 4, at 15.
7 This illustrious member of the healing profession was the Portuguese neurolo-
gist Egas Moniz, who utilized the lobotomy as a treatment for schizophrenia.
RoBrIscmR, supra note 4, at 88.
8 Dr. Robitscher estimates that, between the lobotomy's introduction into Amer-
ican psychiatric practice in the early 1940s and its virtual demise in the 1950s,
40,000 to 50,000 such operations were performed. Many less-developed countries,
which cannot afford expensive programs of drug therapy for their citizens, con-
tinue to rely on the lobotomy as a means of psychiatric treatment Id. 88-89.
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There is now a trend towards "aversive" behavior modification.
No one can now be certain what good or ill effects such treatment
has. One must therefore conclude that extreme modalities of ther-
apy are often employed freely without adequate prior testing, only
to be abandoned for new fads.
Dr. Robitscher paints an equally disquieting picture of the un-
scientific and variable nature of psychiatric diagnosis.9 If psychiatry
were subjected to the standards of precision the law requires for
statutes,10 diagnoses such as "sociopath," "psychopath," "schizo-
phrenic," ".antisocial personality," and "passive-aggressive" would be
rejected as void for vagueness. Even the categories of mental illness.
fluctuate. For example, the psychiatric establishment tergiversates
in its assessment of so-called deviate sexual behavior. In 1973,
the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from,
its list of mental "diseases," despite extensive disagreement. Mas-
turbation was at one time treated as a dangerous disease causing
permanent mental impairment. Now it is considered normal
behavior. Some psychiatrists have even advised it as a form of
therapy. Nonetheless, on the basis of such broad and protean con-
cepts, the law deprives people of their liberty and property, relieves
them of responsibility, and/or provides them with substantial eco-
nomic benefits."
As psychiatry fluctuated in its definitions of mental illness and
its specifications of the appropriate therapies, so has the legal profes-
sion wavered in its approach to the role of psychiatry in the law.
9 The subjective and discretionary nature of psychiatric diagnosis is illustrated
by the testimony of the late Dr. Manfred Guttmacher in an unreported case from
Berks County, Pennsylvania. At issue was whether the defendant, a thirteen
year-old boy, was of sufficient emotional maturity to be prosecuted for murder as
an adult. In the face of evidence that the defendent was a slow learner in school,
perhaps because he suffered by comparison with his brighter twin brother, Dr.
Guttmacher testified that the boy was as bright as the average fourteen year-old
and should therefore be prosecuted as an adult. Ironically, Dr. Guttmacher, him-
self the twin brother of the distinguished Alan Guttmacher, did not find the twin-
ship to be important, despite the great significance psychiatrists generally place
on being a twin.
1o See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) ("[A] statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due proqess of law.").
11 One of the most celebrated examples of psychiatric waffling involves the
meaning of the diagnostic term "sociopath." At the trial of one Comer Blocker,
charged with the murder of his common-law wife, a psychiatrist from St. Elizabeth's
Hospital testified that sociopathy was not a mental disease. Blocker, although
diagnosed a sociopath, was thus deprived of a chance for an acquittal by reason of
insanity. Shortly after Blocker's conviction, the St. Elizabeth's psychiatric staff
changed its mind and determined that sociopathic individuals were mentally ill
after all. This psychiatric "flip flop," as it was popularly called, won Blocker a
new trial. RoBrrscimR, supra note 4, at 168-70.
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A generation ago, psychiatrist Manfred Guttmacher and law profes-
sor Henry Weihofen advocated displacing courts and lawyers with
psychiatrists.12 Many lawyers and judges believed in psychiatry's
claimed ability to diagnose and treat criminals. The medical model
of crime was ascendant.' 3 Institutions such as the prison hospital
at Patuxent, Maryland, were created to "treat" and "cure" anti-
social adult criminals and juvenile delinquents. No one knows how
many people were indefinitely incarcerated in such institutions, until
the courts declared "defective delinquent" statutes unconstitutional
and ordered the release of adults held beyond the maximum terms
otherwise permitted for their offenses.14 Comparative longitudinal
studies of persons subjected to such treatment reveal little differ-
ence between the treated offenders and the untreated control group.15
In like manner, the legal and criminological establishments once
adhered to the notion of rehabilitation through imprisonment, with-
out substantial evidence of its efficacy. Recently, however, rehabili-
tation has been abandoned for retributive theories. 1
12 M. GuTrmcACER & H. WEHOFEN, PsYcAvay AND = .LAw (1952).
1' Thus developed the insanity defense as articulated in Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled, United States v. Browner, 471
F.2d 969, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Durham altered the traditional test of insanity
so as to exculpate from criminal responsibility those whose forbidden acts were
the "producet" of a mental disease or defect, as established primarily by expert
psychiatric testimony. 214 F.2d at 874-76. Eighteen years later, the District of
Columbia Circuit in Browner abandoned the Durham approach, in part because it
created "value dominance" by the psychiatric experts giving testimony. 471 F.2d
at 981-83. Robitscher himself derides the use of psychiatric testimony in situations
in which judges and juries are fully competent to draw reasonable conclusions.
RoBrrscnm, supra note 4, at 27-28.
14 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pifer, 440 Pa. 172, 269 A.2d 909 (1970), in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that commitment of a prison inmate
to a state institution for mental defectives under the authority of a repealed Penn-
sylvania statute was improper because the statute fell short of providing constitu-
tionally required due process safeguards. The statute, 61 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 541-
542.6 (Purdon 1964) (repealed 1968), was repealed two years before the Pifer
decision.
15 See, e.g., B. BEBELSON & G. STElNn, HuM- Bm uvon: AN INvENT RY OF
ScINTFc Fm=mcs 631 (1964); E. Powxns & H. Wrrmsm, AN Ex mUmENT 3:N
T=E Pn v-T, IoN OF DErmqQuENcY: THE CAimR=E-SomERvmlLE YoUTH Snrmon
(1951); McCord, A Thirty Year Follow-Up of Treatment Effects, A.emuCAx
Psyc soixocrsr 284-89 (1978). McCord studied a treatment program for juvenile
delinquency prevention founded in 1935 by Dr. Richard Clark Cabot. The study
compared 325 men who had been in the treatment program with 325 "matched
mates" assigned to a control group and concluded that the untreated men com-
mitted fewer crimes than those subjected to treatment
'6 In 1962, the American Law Institute, in an official draft of the Model Penal
Code, extolled rehabilitation as a primary goal of sentencing. MODEL PENAL. CODE
J 1.02(2) (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). More recent discussions of the issue
are less committed to the notion of rehabilitation and more mindful of the affirma-
tive value of punishment. See generally TwENmEN CENmmY FuND, FAno ANDm
CETAIN PuNismMENT: REPORT ON CnImINAL SENTENcING (1976). See also Form,
CuMn~rALs AND Vicmrs: A TRL4 JUDGE REFL=Cs ON Cmm AN PrmsumEr
(1980), in which the writer analyses sentencing fads.
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Although Dr. Robitscher's method is descriptive and anecdotal,
rather than analytical, the reader is led to conclude that psychiatry
has assumed its extraordinary position in American society in part
because public and private agencies, seeking paternalistic, authori-
tative, and simplistic answers to complicated social and individual
problems, have turned to psychiatrists to relieve themselves of
decisionmaking responsibility, and in part because enormous eco-
nomic benefits accrue to psychiatrists, agencies, and on occasion,
even the patients, from using psychiatric opinions.
Robitscher's most useful and insightful observations are em-
bedded throughout the book in reports on specific cases. From
them I cull the following significant and seldom recognized prob-
lems:
1. Psychiatry is a two-tier profession-one for the rich and one
for the poor.
2. The United States is developing into a "therapeutic state"
in which psychiatric judgments are imposed by governmental au-
thorities upon the public.
3. The helping professions are a "growth industry."
4. Psychiatry and mental health is a big business that has eco-
nomic consequences far beyond providing treatment for mentally
ill patients. Although Dr. Robitscher does not examine these
problems in depth 17 or offer remedial proposals,18 he does, how-
ever, graphically reveal that these pervasive and serious issues de-
serve careful consideration.
In 1968, the Kerner Committee reported: "Our nation is mov-
ing toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and un-
equal." 19 Lawyers have long known that the legal profession is
divided into two classes that mirror this fundamental split in
American society: private, well-paid, and well-prepared counsel for
17For example, Dr. Robitscher does not deal with the serious problems con-
cerning the competence and accountability of mental health personnel. Many
unqualified people hold themselves out as professionals and advise and treat un-
wary members of the public; in many jurisdictions, licensing requirements are
loose or non-existent for psychologists, marriage counsellors, and school counsellors
and therapists.
18One interesting suggestion is the encouragement of more hunanistically
oriented people to enter the field of psychiatry. This, as Dr. Robitscher observes,
would require the abolition or drastic restructuring of the medical degree
requirement for psychiatrists, dearly a reform that will not come easily. RoBrrscnmiM
supra note 4, at 480-81.
1 9 REPoRT OF Tim NAT7L ADvISoRY CoMZnN ON Crvm DisoaDEas 1 (1968).
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the predominantly white middle-class and wealthy; and salaried
employees of public and quasi-public agencies for the predominantly
non-white poor. Although many able individuals work for these
agencies for the poor, it is abundantly clear that there is not a one-
to-one relationship between lawyer and client and that, on the
whole, the quality of legal services is not comparable. Dr. Robit-
scher presents convincing evidence that, similarly, two separate and
unequal classes of psychiatric and psychological practices exist. The
poor receive routine examinations (or non-examinations) 20 by
employees of public and quasi-public agencies. Often these are
professionals who may feel their allegiance is owed to the agency
rather than the patient. The wealthy, by contrast, receive as much
time and attention as they choose to pay for, as well as the undi-
vided loyalty of their own psychiatrists and psychologists. The
social, moral, and constitutional implications of such a denial of
equal protection, in the instances in which judicial decisions are
predicated upon the findings of psychiatrists and psychologists, are
disquieting and demand further examination.
The "therapeutic state" concept impinges on and warps many
aspects of the law. The "right to treatment" doctrine was en-
thusiastically embraced by some courts.2 1 But no comparable doc-
trine establishing the right to refuse treatment has emerged.22 The
doctrine of "the least restrictive environment" 23 provides some
measure of protection for elderly and allegedly mentally ill per-
sons. But a right to remain in the environment of one's choice
has yet to be articulated or enforced. Significantly, people who
have not been convicted of a crime or adjudged insane are none-
2
0oOn occasion, psychiatrists render a report without ever having seen the
subject. L. ForEm, No ONE WLL LissEN: How Ott LEGAL SvsTFNi BaTrrAuzEs
TnE YouTm'oL PooR 140-46 (1970); cf. Alsop, Psychiatric Autopsy; The Dead Are
Psychoanalyzed at Murder Trials; Technique Aids Suspects Pleading Self-Defense,
Wall St. J., July 23, 1980, at 46, col. 1 (describing the recent use of the
"psychiatric autopsy" in which psychiatrists who have never seen the deceased
diagnose his before-death mental condition).
21 See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Johnson v.
Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 299 (D. Md. 1979).
22 Some courts, however, have issued protective orders restraining the forcible
administration of drugs upon protesting patients and prisoners. See, e.g., Davis v.
Hubbard, 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 1980) (state may not administer
psychotropic drugs to state mental patient without his informed consent, unless
patient presents a danger to himself or others).23 See, e.g., Holderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hasp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (holding that the Developmental
Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976),
establishes a right to the least restrictive environment on behalf of mentally retarded
persons); Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 299 (D. Md. 1979) (holding that
the right to treatment encompasses the right to the least restrictive environment in
juvenile civil commitment proceedings).
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theless forced to live in accordance with the dictates of mental
health personnel. Courts, social workers, psychiatrists, and some
lawyers compel individuals to reside in places that may be cleaner,
have better supervision, and are perhaps more esthetically appealing
than the residence of choice. Similar decisions separate children
from their natural parents and place them with strangers, on the
basis of testimony that the proposed environment is better for these
children.
Government intrusion for therapeutic reasons into the lives
of law abiding citizens has developed insidiously. Admittedly, in
most, but not all, cases the motivation is good. The desire to
help the young, elderly, and infirm is laudable. However, it often
results in foisting upon these classes of people, and upon those
who are merely eccentric or non-conforming, severe restrictions in
life style, place of residence, and other choices, all in the name of a
therapeutic state.
Certain zoning ordinances, 24 laws prohibiting various types of
sexual contact among consenting adults, 25 and pornography laws 
26
are but a few of the legislative enactments promulgated under the
guise of the state's health and welfare powers, but that are, in
reality, therapeutic measures to enforce certain behavioral norms.
Dr. Robitscher suggests that such intrusions into the lives of the
citizenry are undesirable and unnecessary. Whether they are com-
patible with a free democratic society is an issue that requires
searching consideration by the legal profession and the public.
Concomitant with the development of a therapeutic state is
the burgeoning of mental health personnel. According to the pre-
liminary report of the President's Commission on Mental Health,
issued in 1977, "[a]t any one given time 25 per cent of the popula-
tion is under the kind of emotional distress that results in symp-
toms." 27 Because vast numbers of people are encouraged to seek
24 Zoning ordinances using familial relationships as a criterion with which to
regulate occupancy are an example. Courts have differed on the constitutionality
of such laws. Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1973)
(upholding the constitutionality of a town ordinance prohibiting multi-family
dwellings) with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 495 (1977) (striking
down on constitutional due process grounds a similar ordinance because it limited
the definition of family to include only certain categories of related individuals).
2 5 See, e.g., 26 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2002 to 2006, 26-2009 to 2010 (1978),
which outlaw sodomy, bestiality, "seduction," incest, adultery and fornication.
26Although manifesting some confusion about the proper definition of ob-
scenity, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld such laws against constitutional
attack. See, e.g., Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
27THE PREsmENT's CoaM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, TASK PANEL REPORTS,
app. vol. II, at 20 (1978).
[Vol 129:253
BOOK REVIEW
therapy for these symptoms, mental health services are perhaps one
of the major growth occupations. Furthermore, a large propor-
tion of American psychiatrists, psychologists, counsellors and thera-
pists are now paid directly or indirectly from public funds. Many
antipoverty programs, designed to provide mental health services
for the poor, have been of dubious benefit to them.28 Indeed, the
real beneficiaries of these programs may well have been the middle-
class employees of the agencies. However, such expenditures of
public monies are rarely, if ever, presented as an issue upon which
the voters can express an opinion. Obviously, however, in times
such as the present, when public budgets are shrinking, monies
spent on mental health detract from expenditures for other public
needs, such as education, housing, environmental protection and
the like. Intelligent, informed public choices should be made. Dr.
Robitscher demonstrates clearly that the amount of money spent
on school counsellors, compulsory marriage counselling, court
psychiatrists and psychologists, and community mental health per-
sonnel are not de minimis.
All too often, such health personnel acquire a vested interest
in maintaining their programs.29 For example, in 1978, $1.1 bil-
lion was paid to people classified as mentally disabled under social
security.30 Clearly, there is a danger that the mental health clinics
that treat the mentally ill or the institutions in which they reside,
both paid in whole or in part from public funds, may find little
incentive to "cure" and discharge these people.
Dr. Robitscher also points out that individuals are granted or
denied compensation, reimbursement for medical expenses, reim-
bursement for equipment and supplies, tax deductions, and count-
less other financial benefits based upon the opinions of mental
health professionals. He suggests that, on occasion, these decisions
may not be based on medical factors but on social considerations.
Although courts have long been criticized for "result oriented"
decisions, judicial decisions are at least made after public trials
and are subject to appellate review. Opinions of mental health
professionals, on the other hand, are made in the privacy of an
office or clinic, rarely subject to adversarial questioning or careful
review. Not only the right to liberty, but the right to property
28 Dr. Robitscher informs us that a psychiatrist once prescribed a washing
machine for an overworked woman of limited means. As a therapeutic measure,
it was paid for by medicaid. Without such a prescription, the purchase would not
have been compensable. RoBrrscnmi, supra note 4, at 216.
29 Id. 129.
80 Id. 131.
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and entitlements, is frequently affected by the in camera decisions
of mental health personnel.
The Powers of Psychiatry is an important book. Dr. Robit-
scher, in his wide-ranging examination of the activities of psychia-
trists and other mental health professionals, has performed a
significant service in laying before the public examples of the mani-
fold overt and hidden powers granted, explicitly or by default, to
these individuals and their institutions. He challenges psychiatrists,
sociologists, lawyers, and political scientists to explore the serious
implications of the uses and abuses of psychiatry and to respond
intelligently.
